W e review the history and state of the art of models used in climate research, including integrated assessment models (IAMs) and national studies, and those that model mitigation and climate-change impacts. We assess how and to what extent they represent distributional impacts within countries. We argue that there is much scope to improve the representation of income distribution and poverty. Given the diversity of models, this endeavour presents fundamental challenges for some models, but possibly requires only incremental changes in others.
. Climate mitigation policies can generate income and price shocks, which in some cases can also increase health risks to the poor 8 . Climate mitigation technologies can also generate differential impacts on different income groups, a notable example being the extensive deployment of biomass for energy and its implications for food security 9, 10 . In order to meet the Paris Agreement climate goals of keeping warming below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, national pledges to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions need to be ramped up significantly 11 . Such ambitious climate policies may present greater risks to those in poverty 8 . Incorporating these impacts on poverty can make climate economic models more useful for national policymakers to evaluate climate policies and their impacts on social protection goals. These improvements would be timely, considering recent attention towards combating both social inequalities and climate change. While almost 1 billion people have putatively risen out of extreme income poverty (earning less than US$1.90 per day) 12 , progress viewed through a broader lens of basic human development, or multidimensional poverty, is far less encouraging 13, 14 . Multidimensional indicators recognize the multifaceted nature of human deprivations, whose patterns do not necessarily coincide with income deprivations. In the last few decades, income inequality within countries has also increased across many parts of the world 15 . Models that can assess income distributional impacts of climate change and policies, and assess poverty in its multiple dimensions, would provide policymakers with tools to more rigorously assess climate change and human development goals simultaneously.
The recognition of distributional concerns in climate research can be traced back to the nineties, the timeframe of the IPCC's first assessment reports 16, 17 . The research gaps identified then have been repeated in subsequent IPCC assessments, showing they persist today 4, 5 . Many studies with countries or regions as units of analysis have concluded that poor countries are more vulnerable and have lower adaptive capacity to climate change [1] [2] [3] . Moreover, aggregate cost estimates mask significant differences across populations 18 , and adaptive capacity is uneven within societies as well 19 . The IPCC's most recent Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) reflects much evolution in regional studies of climate impacts, but distributional impacts remain under-explored.
In general, while IAMs and macroeconomic models used in climate research have evolved from producing global outcomes towards increasing geographic detail 20 , more models have to move beyond representing average regional effects to quantify and project distributional effects and their complexities within countries. Even global reduced form models that generate aggregate or regional statistics, such as the social cost of carbon, have different outcomes when they incorporate income inequality by assigning greater weight to damages at lower income levels 18, [21] [22] [23] [24] . These equity weights and the types of damage functions assumed can greatly influence decisions on when, how much, and where to mitigate GHG emissions 25, 26 . Models that grapple more explicitly with these normative frameworks and their implications can better inform policymakers and their perceptions of what is fair, feasible and consistent with development policies. Some studies using global IAMs serve as examples of such enhancements, though they formulate policies for idealized global or regional policymakers [27] [28] [29] . With increasing attention given to adaptation, research gaps have broadened towards understanding the effects of adaptation decisions on poverty and income inequality 30 . The channels of climate impact on humans are inherently multi-faceted. An example of such a channel is human health vulnerabilities relating to clean water, sanitation, healthcare and education 4, 6, 19 . Models dealing with cost-benefit analyses of adaptation choices can better inform policymakers' decisions if they can quantify multidimensional poverty. Estimating future vulnerabilities to climate change also requires the construction of future socioeconomic scenarios that quantify future 
the state of the art
We organize this discussion in terms of models that assess climate mitigation and those that assess climate-change impacts. We also distinguish national-level models from global-level models. For the latter, we make a distinction between IAMs for cost-benefit analysis (CBA-IAMs), which tend to be more stylized, and IAMs with a predominantly mitigation framing that are more detailed and processoriented (process-IAMs). Models that analyse the effects of climate mitigation policies both at the national and global levels can be grouped into general equilibrium (GE) and partial equilibrium (PE, often bottom-up energy system models). Climate change impacts models tend to be national or local studies that sometimes represent the macroeconomy, or global CBA-IAMs. The model types and examples mentioned in this section are summarized in Table 1 .
In the realm of climate mitigation, many national studies assess the distributional impacts of mitigation using general equilibrium approaches, mostly for the US and Europe [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] , though increasingly also for developing countries 32, [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] . Methodologically, the literature reveals a variety of stages towards including distributional impacts on households. With regard to how households are represented, approaches include simply imposing distributions 49, 50 , using microsimulation models (see Table 1) 40, 51, 52 , and representing multiple household types within models 31, 53, 54 . Some of these approaches are being applied with global process-IAMs as well 10, 55, 56 . However, the norm for studies in this realm continues to be the use of single representative households 54 . Increasing household heterogeneity in modelling tools is only the first step. For meaningful results, models also need to incorporate other agents and the relevant dynamics that influence the distributional impacts of climate policies and climate change impacts on households. For instance, the role of the government (which is usually modelled quite stylistically in CGEs) is often decisive for the distributional impacts of policies 40 . The policy instruments used to represent climate policies are typically limited to the simulation of economy-wide carbon taxes 57, 58 . Many studies assess the interaction of climate policies with social protection policies, such as revenue recycling. However, social protection policies may also differ in developing countries that lack well-developed income-tax systems.
Other relevant dynamics that affect the distributional impacts of climate policies include the evolution of the structure of labour and capital markets over time. Without distinguishing the relevant labour markets in a CGE model, sectoral shifts in employment and wages from mitigation policies, for instance, cannot be analysed. Structural changes in labour and capital market shares also affect the non-economic impacts of climate change and potential response policies. For instance, the number of workers exposed to heat stress is likely to be much lower in a high-productive, capital-intensive, robotized world than in a low-productive, labour-intensive, impoverished economy. The aggregate impacts on GDP might (or might not) be comparable, but the distributional consequences of heat stress and response policies should be very different.
In bottom-up energy models and global process-IAMs of this style, the analysis of distributional impacts is often limited to consumption of energy by households. Disaggregation of households into several groups or many representative households has been implemented for developed 33, 42, 59, 60 and developing [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] countries, with varying levels of detail. Process-IAMs distinguish multiple household categories within the IAM itself 66, 67 or use separate models to disaggregate energy use from a representative household within the global IAM 62 . These models have been used to analyse global access to electricity 68 and trade-offs between climate policy and energy access 8 . However, by focusing only on household energy price impacts, these models can only analyse the changes in energy consumption, while ignoring any changes in income. They have very limited ability to represent the interlinkages and cascading effects between particular sectors and the rest of the economy, let alone to represent how these effects are distributed across households.
With respect to climate-change impacts, studies that quantify inequality or (multidimensional) poverty are rare (with the exception of a recent World Bank study 6, 69 ). Many impacts and vulnerability studies rely on present-day income distributions and poverty levels to assess future vulnerability 70, 71 . Even if they do use future socioeconomic scenarios, studies typically adopt simple rules such as constant income distributions, or poverty levels indexed to GDP 10, 19 . A patchwork of national studies that uses a more complete accounting of income and/or consumption impacts 51, 56, [72] [73] [74] exists, but differences in measures and approaches makes it difficult to draw broader conclusions or comparisons. Moreover, climate change can affect households in different ways, through shifts in sectoral employment, through price changes of essential goods or through the destruction of assets. Some attempts to include such dynamics in global processIAMs exist 10, 50, 52, 53 , but these are early developmental steps. CBA-IAMs produce global economic assessments of climate change impacts. In these studies, distributional weights have long been used to represent equity across generations or regions 4 . Such weighting strongly influences the valuation of future impacts of climate change 18, 25, 26 or the valuation of impacts that take place outside a particular country 22 . Recently, we have seen experiments with the use of distributional weights within generations, to represent inequality aversion between countries 21, 24 or across sub-national income groups 18 . A limitation in these studies is the strong assumption of either static present-day subnational income distributions or convergence between countries 21, 24, 28 . In summary, although the above discussion cites a wealth of literature on distributional impacts, the large majority of climate-related models do not consider any distributional impacts. Moreover, all the methods discussed here have important shortcomings that need to be addressed. For instance, for a full account of the distributional impacts of climate policies and climate change impacts, both the income and consumption aspects of households need to be represented and the relevant determinants of changes on either side need to be included. However, whereas partial equilibrium models generally include higher levels of heterogeneity (especially at the global level), they only focus on changes in consumption, and while general equilibrium models include both consumption and income they are often more aggregated and omit relevant economic dynamics that shape future income distribution development. More broadly, the existing approaches narrowly focus on economic inequality, whereas climate change impacts may manifest through multi-faceted poverty. Not all approaches can include such a broad scope, but national-level models in particular can better inform policymakers with a broader focus.
Drawing from economics
In better representing income inequality dynamics in climate economic models, it seems logical to draw from existing theories of income distribution in economics. In just the last few years, several publications [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] seek to explain global trends in income inequality. However, even among economists there are multiple views, but no single unified theory, to explain income inequality. Previous theories of income distribution offer building blocks of explanatory mechanisms, but provide no consensus on their integration 80 . These building blocks relate to the productivity of and returns to capital and labour, and the distribution of their income, among other things. The recent body of literature adds empirical insights on the importance of government structure and policy in explaining regional differences in the evolution of income inequality 75, 76, 79 . However, there are no generally accepted theories relating these drivers to inequality, let alone ways to forecast their future evolution. The approach to drawing from this literature may therefore have to be experimental. Rather than aiming to incorporate dynamics, suitable models can parameterize some of these drivers, so that at least scenarios can be constructed to represent different assumptions, such as variable capital shares of income, or redistributive mechanisms.
In the field of poverty measurement, multidimensional indicators, such as the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) 14 , have gained attention as alternatives to income-based measures. The MPI focuses on education, health (including food) and living conditions, including access to water, electricity and sanitation. Others define a more comprehensive set of indicators of human well-being, only some of which may be relevant for any particular application 81 . The value of these indicators is that they provide a basis for climate impact studies (and to a lesser extent for climate policy studies) to quantify impacts in non-monetary yet standardized terms that can enable comparisons across different types of impacts that have similar types of outcomes. The challenge is that there are no established indicators or practices. Process-IAMs, which may already include the evolution of these other crucial dimensions, are well-suited to broaden their objective functions to include these non-monetary outcomes, and examine trade-offs between them.
moving forward
Different types of models, depending on their objective and geographic scale, may require different approaches to enhance the representation of poverty and inequality (see Fig. 1 ). We discuss these in the sequence of our suggested future directions shown in Fig. 1 , by column from left to right. This list of suggestions is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather highlights examples of future directions that apply to different models. In the realm of impact measurement, dimensions beyond income need to be better represented where possible, and where not, multiple income thresholds should be used. This is most relevant for national models of climate impacts, or global process-IAMs of mitigation pathways that already include income distribution and multiple poverty-related variables. Multidimensional poverty metrics can be used to quantify the change in poverty headcount or gap from different types of climate impacts that may not all be monetizable, such as access to clean water or adequate nourishment. This broadening of metrics has the added benefit of enabling comparisons across the Sustainable Development Goals, which include such targets. In the long run, deepening integrated research across scales, by examining local climate impacts alongside other national drivers of poverty, would better represent climate as a threat multiplier that compounds other poverty risks 19 . Models that represent climate impacts as damage functions, such as global CBA-IAMs, can create formulations that parameterize regions and their income distributions and incorporate equity weights. This then deepens the assessment of equity more explicitly in solutions for climate policy. As discussed earlier, some examples of this exist, but these need to become standard practice. Furthermore, more research on empirical estimates of regional damages and their distribution can help calibrate these damage functions.
Model features
Moving from a single representative household to multiple household groups is possible in any model type. It can serve as a foundational step towards building the capability to examine policy impacts that depend on household characteristics. However, this step entails increases in data needs that would expand with the extent of household disaggregation. Besides increasing the number of household types, some modellers have developed microsimulation models or worked with stylized distributions of income and consumption in future scenarios. These exceptions need to become the norm where feasible.
Models that already incorporate income distributions, but in static form, can extend their capability to examine climate (or mitigation) impacts under different scenarios of future income inequality by constructing scenarios of future income convergence and divergence, both between and within countries. Such scenarios can consist of stylized assumptions, or incorporate economic dynamics, to the extent feasible 49, 69, 82 . These improvements are relevant to both global IAMs and national economic models.
Incorporating multiple channels of impact on poverty and inequality would be more involved, and require incremental steps in macroeconomic models that already model multiple household groups. The channels we have identified are income, consumption, and assets. There are a few examples of climate impact studies, typically agriculture economic models, which incorporate both consumption side effects and income side effects on households. This needs to become the standard for economic impact studies. Capturing income effects requires modelling labour productivity, which affects income directly through returns to labour and indirectly through macroeconomic effects of changes in overall labour productivity. Another step forward is to represent changes to capital assets, which are vulnerable to extreme events and affect future income or consumption streams. This may not apply to certain types of macroeconomic growth-models that use fixed capital and labour shares in production functions.
The role of government in shaping future inequality and in formulating responses to climate change is so dominant that models need to move towards incorporating policy mechanisms. Among economic models that do represent government policies, a broader range of policies for both climate mitigation and social protection would better reflect real-world institutions, especially in developing economies that do not have well-developed income-tax systems.
Partial equilibrium and bottom-up energy models, if they include household heterogeneity, can be enhanced by exogenous assessment of income effects, or of specific relevant linkages that affect the poor, such as the air pollution and health impacts from energy transitions on different income groups 8 . This could be an important addition to several global process-IAMs as well.
Bringing into climate economic models a new feature of the real world -that of social heterogeneity -introduces additional sources of uncertainty in model output, as well as the need to calibrate new model parameters to the real world. Empirical studies of climate impacts and damages on poverty and on inequality can help test and refine new model features. Monte Carlo simulations over large scenario spaces associated with specific sets of parameters can help characterize the range of uncertainty attributable to these model enhancements.
These changes will be challenging. They require not just analytical advances, but also building bridges across research communities, to explore incorporating evolving theories on income inequality from economics into climate economic models. While there are a few examples that can lead the way, in general, these exceptions need to become the norm, so that the research community can keep up with the pace required of policymakers to combat climate change. Data limitations in understanding the mechanisms that drive income distribution and in empirical estimates of climate impacts exacerbate this challenge. This will require more interaction between research groups working on global models and local research communities that conduct empirical studies or work with national models.
